Checks: predicates and profiles

@codai/axiom-checks runs a list of CheckRefs over a ManifestBundle and returns a CheckReport. Every check is a typed predicate with a Zod-validated params object; expr.cel (S-301) is one such predicate whose param is a CEL expression evaluated over the same facts.

{ "id": "no-env", "predicate": "path.deny", "params": { "globs": [".env*"] }, "severity": "error" }

• id is the check’s name in the report; unique per merged list.
• predicate is <group>.<name> and must be registered.
• params are validated against the predicate’s schema; {} is not automatically valid — a predicate with required params fails closed.
• severity (default error) re-labels every finding the predicate produces.

Globs everywhere are picomatch with dot: true, matched against the artifact’s RelPath.

Verdict and fail-closed semantics

verdict is one of:

Verdict	When
pass	no finding with severity error
fail	at least one error finding from a predicate
error	something could not be evaluated: unknown predicate, invalid params, a fact provider threw, a predicate threw, or guard.external was requested

error is never downgraded. apply treats anything other than pass as ERR_CHECKS_FAILED. Provider failures appear as findings with facts.code (an ERR_* code) and facts.__provider: true.

flowchart TD
  S[runChecks bundle · profile · root?] --> P{preImage[] present<br/>and root given?}
  P -- drifted --> E[verdict: error<br/>manifest.preImage ERR_PREIMAGE_CHANGED]
  P -- verified / unverified --> L[for each CheckRef in merged order]
  L --> K{predicate registered?}
  K -- no --> E2[verdict: error ERR_PREDICATE_UNKNOWN]
  K -- yes --> V{params valid?}
  V -- no --> E3[verdict: error ERR_PREDICATE_PARAMS]
  V -- yes --> R{provider available?<br/>repo needs root · guard needs --allow-guards}
  R -- repo missing --> SK[skipped]
  R -- guard disabled --> E4[verdict: error ERR_FACT_DISABLED]
  R -- ok --> RUN[run → findings]
  RUN --> F{any error-severity finding?}
  F -- provider threw --> E5[verdict: error ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED]
  F -- yes --> FAIL[verdict: fail]
  F -- no --> PASS[verdict: pass]

Repo predicates (repo.*) need a root; when the run has none, or the profile sets facts.allowRepo: false, they are skipped (provider status skipped), not failed — there is nothing to check against.

Pre-image (S-402). When a root is given and the manifest carries preImage[], runChecks first compares every entry with the tree. Any difference emits an error finding manifest.preImage (facts.code: ERR_PREIMAGE_CHANGED, expected, actual) per path, forces verdict: error and sets report.preImage: "drifted"; otherwise "verified". Without a root or without preImage the report says "unverified". A stored CheckReport therefore names the tree it judged.

Predicates run sequentially in merged order; findings are sorted by (severity, id, path); factsDigest = sha256(JCS(facts)) lets a report be replayed.

Predicate catalogue

Seventeen built-ins, exactly as registered in packages/checks/src/predicates/index.ts. requires names the fact providers the predicate reads.

path.allow

Every artifact path must match at least one glob. requires: manifest.

Param	Type	Required
globs	string[] (min 1, each non-empty)	yes

Fails on each path outside the allowed set. Finding id path.allow.

{ "id": "only-src", "predicate": "path.allow", "params": { "globs": ["src/**", "docs/**"] } }

path.deny

No artifact path may match any glob. requires: manifest.

Param	Type	Required
globs	string[] (min 1)	yes

{ "id": "no-env", "predicate": "path.deny", "params": { "globs": [".env*", "**/*.pem"] } }

path.reservedNames

Re-runs the schema’s relPathIssues() on every path (belt and braces after schema validation). requires: manifest. Params: {} (strict, no keys).

{ "id": "path.reservedNames", "predicate": "path.reservedNames", "params": {} }

content.noSecrets

Scans the first 4 MiB of every non-deleted artifact’s bytes (decoded as UTF-8, non-fatal) against named regexes. requires: manifest, content.

Param	Type	Default
disable	string[] of pattern names	[]
allowPaths	glob[] of paths to skip	[]
pii	boolean — also scan for personal data (cnp, email, phoneRo, card)	false

Pattern names (SECRET_PATTERN_NAMES), by kind:

• secret (always on): credentialAssignment, awsKey, githubToken, privateKey, jwt, slackToken.
• pii (PII_PATTERN_NAMES, only with pii: true): cnp, email, phoneRo, card.

One finding per (artifact, pattern) with id content.noSecrets.<name> and facts.pattern.

Why PII is opt-in (S-414, 2026-09-20). Replaying 30 OSS repositories’ recent commits through the default profile rejected real, harmless edits: with every pattern on, 110 of 3240 files matched email (maintainer addresses in pyproject.toml, git@github.com in CONTRIBUTING, user@example.com in docs) and 107 matched the old credentialAssignment regex (token: str, token = var.set(...), token: write in a workflow). Personal data in a source tree is a policy question for the profile owner (brivio and metu set pii: true); a write gate that refuses every commit touching pyproject.toml is not usable as a default.

Precision rules (all corpus-derived; tests in predicates.test.ts pin both the false positives that must pass and the true positives that must still fail):

• credentialAssignment matches only a quoted literal ≥ 8 chars after password|passwd|pwd|secret|token|api_key|access_key|auth_token|client_secret (optionally prefixed, DB_PASSWORD=), and skips placeholders (<your-api-key>, ${SECRET}, {{ vault }}, %s_upgrades, changeme, my_actual_password, xxxxxxxx, password), interpolations and identifier-shaped values without digits ("keyring.backends.libsecret"). Type annotations, None, function calls and env lookups never match. Remaining corpus hits: 9/3240 files — every one a real quoted credential in a test or README (a digest-auth test password in httpx, a webhook-token sample in the loguru README, a 32-hex lock token in filelock docs).
• email skips RFC 2606/6761 reserved domains (example.*, .test, .invalid, localhost), *@github.com (incl. users.noreply.github.com), git@/noreply@ locals and asset pseudo-addresses (icon@2x.png).
• cnp requires a valid Romanian CNP: month/day range, county 01–52/70 and the mod-11 control digit (weights 279146358279) — epoch-millisecond timestamps, ISBN-13s and big-int test vectors no longer match.

card is not a bare digit-run regex: a 13–16-digit run (optional single space / hyphen separators) counts only if it passes the Luhn checksum, is not a single repeated digit (0000 0000 0000 0000), and is not part of a UUID (00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000). Epoch-millisecond timestamps, zero UUIDs and sequential placeholders therefore pass; every real test PAN (Visa 4111 1111 1111 1111, Amex 378282246310005, …) is still caught.

{ "id": "content.noSecrets", "predicate": "content.noSecrets",
  "params": { "pii": true, "disable": ["phoneRo"], "allowPaths": ["docs/**", "**/*.test.ts"] } }

Globs and Next.js route groups. Every glob parameter (path.*, allowPaths, repo.*, content.maxBytes.globs, …) goes through one matcher (picomatch, dot: true). A parenthesised segment with no glob metacharacters — app/(app)/**, (marketing) — is escaped automatically so it matches the literal directory; real extglobs (@(a|b), !(x), +(y)) and already-escaped \(app\) are left as written.

content.maxBytes

Fails on any non-deleted artifact larger than max. Uses manifest.bytes when present, otherwise the resolved content length. requires: manifest.

Param	Type	Required
max	int ≥ 0	yes
globs	string[] — restrict to these paths	no (all paths)

{ "id": "small-svgs", "predicate": "content.maxBytes", "params": { "max": 65536, "globs": ["**/*.svg"] } }

content.encodingUtf8

Fails on any non-deleted artifact whose bytes are not valid UTF-8. requires: manifest, content.

Param	Type	Required
globs	string[]	no (all paths)

{ "id": "utf8-sources", "predicate": "content.encodingUtf8", "params": { "globs": ["**/*.{ts,md,json}"] } }

manifest.maxArtifacts

Fails when artifactCount > max. requires: manifest.

Param	Type	Required
max	int ≥ 0	yes

{ "id": "manifest.maxArtifacts", "predicate": "manifest.maxArtifacts", "params": { "max": 200 } }

manifest.maxTotalBytes

Fails when the sum of artifacts[].bytes exceeds max. requires: manifest.

Param	Type	Required
max	int ≥ 0	yes

{ "id": "manifest.maxTotalBytes", "predicate": "manifest.maxTotalBytes", "params": { "max": 8388608 } }

manifest.requireSigned

Verifies the bundle’s detached DSSE envelopes (bundle.signatures[]) against the root’s trust store and, optionally, enforces the anti-rollback counter. Full protocol, key handling and CLI in signing.md. requires: manifest; needs a root (no root → verdict: error).

Param	Type	Default	Meaning
minSignatures	int 1–16	1	distinct trusted keys that must have produced a valid signature
antiRollback	boolean	false	require manifest.counter and counter > .axiom/trust/state.json#lastCounter (and ≥ keys.json#minCounter)
trustFile	string	.axiom/trust/keys.json	root-relative POSIX path of the trust store

Finding ids: signature.missing, signature.unknownKey, signature.bad, signature.notCanonical, signature.rollback (facts.reason ∈ NO_COUNTER | ROLLBACK | BELOW_MIN). Fail-closed: missing trust file → ERR_NOT_FOUND, unreadable/invalid → ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED, corrupt state → ERR_TRUST_STATE_CORRUPT, all as provider errors (verdict: error).

{ "id": "manifest.requireSigned", "predicate": "manifest.requireSigned",
  "params": { "minSignatures": 1, "antiRollback": true } }

apply advances lastCounter only when the effective checks include this predicate with antiRollback: true and the result is status: "applied".

manifest.noDeletes

Fails on every artifact with op: delete. requires: manifest. Params: {}.

{ "id": "manifest.noDeletes", "predicate": "manifest.noDeletes", "params": {} }

deps.max

Parses every artifact matching files as JSON, counts keys in dependencies + devDependencies, fails when the count exceeds max. Non-JSON or non-object content is ignored. requires: manifest, content.

Param	Type	Default
max	int ≥ 0	required
files	glob[]	["**/package.json"]

{ "id": "deps.max", "predicate": "deps.max", "params": { "max": 50 } }

deps.deny

Same parsing as deps.max; one finding deps.deny.<pkg> per denied dependency. requires: manifest, content.

Param	Type	Default
packages	string[] (min 1)	required
files	glob[]	["**/package.json"]

{ "id": "no-telemetry", "predicate": "deps.deny",
  "params": { "packages": ["@vercel/analytics", "pino", "@opentelemetry/api"] } }

repo.noOverwriteOf

Fails when an overwrite or delete targets a path that matches a glob and already exists in the repo. create ops are ignored (they fail at apply with ERR_EXISTS anyway). requires: manifest, repo — skipped without a root.

Param	Type	Required
globs	string[] (min 1)	yes

{ "id": "repo.noOverwriteOf", "predicate": "repo.noOverwriteOf",
  "params": { "globs": [".github/**", "**/*.lock", "pnpm-lock.yaml"] } }

repo.requireCompanion

The brivio check-ripple shape. For each rule, when any artifact path matches when, every expect[].match must be satisfied by at least one artifact path or (unless mustChange) one existing repo file. requires: manifest, repo.

Param	Type
rules	{ when: glob, expect: { name: string, match: glob, mustChange?: boolean = false }[] (min 1) }[] (min 1)

mustChange: true demands that the companion be in this plan — an existing repo file no longer satisfies it. Use it for “touch the schema ⇒ touch a migration” rules, where a stale existing companion is exactly the bug being guarded; singleton companions (client.ts, proxy.ts, en.json) otherwise only bite on a fresh clone. Finding id repo.requireCompanion.<name>, facts.mustChange echoes the flag.

{ "id": "ripple", "predicate": "repo.requireCompanion", "params": { "rules": [
  { "when": "packages/mcp/src/tools/**",
    "expect": [ { "name": "docs", "match": "docs/reference/mcp-tools.md" },
                { "name": "spec", "match": "packages/mcp/spec/tools.json" } ] }
] } }

guard.external

Runs a repository-owned guard script (design §3.2) and maps its output to findings. requires: guard. Disabled by default, twice: the predicate runs only when the profile sets facts.allowGuards: true and the server/CLI was started with --allow-guards. Otherwise it returns one error finding (code: ERR_FACT_DISABLED, “external guards disabled”) → verdict: error.

Param	Type	Default
command	string	required — relative: resolved under <root>/scripts/; absolute: must be in --guard-allowlist
args	string[]	[]
cwd	"root" | "staging"	"root"
timeoutMs	int 1–900000 (15 min; S-406 — anything over a client’s per-call timeout belongs in an axiom_check_start task)	30000
env	record<string,string>	— (added to the scrubbed env)
stdin	"bundle" | "manifest" | "none"	"bundle"
legacyText	boolean	false — accept brivio-style OK name / FAIL name: reason stdout

Command resolution. No shell is ever involved (spawn with an args array, windowsHide: true). A relative command (with or without a scripts/ prefix) must realpath to a file strictly inside <root>/scripts/; any .. segment is rejected. An absolute command must realpath-match an entry of --guard-allowlist exactly. .mjs/.js/.cjs run via the current node (process.execPath), .ps1 via pwsh -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File; any other extension is only allowed as an allowlisted absolute executable. Violations produce an error finding with code: ERR_PREDICATE_PARAMS.

Process environment. The child gets a whitelist only (PATH, HOME, USERPROFILE, SYSTEMROOT, SYSTEMDRIVE, PATHEXT, COMSPEC, TEMP, TMP, TMPDIR, LANG, LC_ALL), plus params.env, plus AXIOM_MANIFEST_DIGEST and AXIOM_ROOT. NODE_OPTIONS is cleared. cwd is the realpath’d root, or the apply staging directory when cwd: "staging" and the runner supplied one (otherwise ERR_PREDICATE_PARAMS).

Stdin. bundle → JCS(ManifestBundle); manifest → JCS(ManifestBody); none → closed immediately.

Output contract. stdout must be one JSON object:

type GuardOutput = {
  ok: boolean;
  findings?: Array<{
    id: string;                       // finding id, e.g. "lint.todo"
    severity?: "error" | "warn" | "info"; // default: "error" when ok:false, "info" when ok:true
    message: string;
    path?: string;                    // RelPath; non-conforming values are kept in facts.rawPath
    facts?: Record<string, unknown>;
  }>;
};

Guard behaviour	Result
exit 0, valid JSON	findings mapped (none → [])
exit ≠ 0, valid JSON	same mapping
ok: false with no findings	one error finding “guard reported ok:false without findings”
exit 0, non-JSON stdout	one error finding, code: ERR_GUARD_OUTPUT (fail closed)
exit ≠ 0, non-JSON stdout	one error finding, code: ERR_GUARD_OUTPUT
wall clock > timeoutMs	process tree killed, one error finding, code: ERR_GUARD_TIMEOUT
runner cancelled (axiom_task_cancel, server stop)	process tree killed, one error finding, code: ERR_TASK_CANCELLED
spawn failure (ENOENT etc.)	one error finding, code: ERR_GUARD_OUTPUT
legacyText: true and no JSON	FAIL name: reason lines → error findings {id: name, message: reason}; only OK lines → []

Evidence. Every finding the guard produces — mapped findings, the “ok:false without findings” fallback, ERR_GUARD_OUTPUT and ERR_GUARD_TIMEOUT — carries facts.evidence = { exitCode, stdout, stderr } (each stream the last 2 KiB) so a FAIL lint is auditable from the report alone, without re-running the guard. facts.command names the guard.

Non-provider findings are re-labelled with the CheckRef severity like every other predicate; provider failures (code above) stay error and force verdict: error.

Concurrency. runChecks runs every guard.external check in a pool of min(4, os.cpus().length) after the sequential predicates. The guard provider status is ok, error (disabled, resolution failure, timeout, bad output) or skipped (no guard checks in the set).

{ "id": "repo-guards", "predicate": "guard.external",
  "params": { "command": "scripts/axiom-guard-adapter.mjs", "timeoutMs": 60000 } }

See integration/brivio.md for wiring brivio’s run-guards.mjs.

expr.cel

A boolean CEL expression over the frozen facts (PLAN.md S-301, decision D-15). Evaluated by @marcbachmann/cel-js 8, loaded lazily on first use so the MCP eager bundle does not pay for it. requires: manifest, content (repo is read when referenced — see below).

Param	Type	Default
expression	string, 1–4096 chars	required
message	string ≤ 2000	expression evaluated to false: <expression>
severity	"error" | "warn" | "info"	the CheckRef severity

Activation — the only variables an expression may reference:

Variable	Shape
manifest	the canonical ManifestBody: name, profile, planDigest, artifacts[], checks[], toolchain, … — integers are CEL int
artifacts	alias of manifest.artifacts: { path, op, mode, digest?: { sha256 }, bytes?, origin? } — delete entries have no digest/bytes
content	map path → { bytes: int, sha256: string, text?: string } for every non-delete artifact whose blob is available; text only when the blob is valid UTF-8 and ≤ 256 KiB
repo	{ exists: map path → bool (for every artifact path), packageJson?, gitHead?, gitDirty? } — only when a root is authorised (facts.allowRepo). Referencing repo without one is an error finding (ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED), never a pass

Semantics. The result must be bool: true → no finding; false → exactly one finding (id: expr.cel, facts.expression) with message; anything else — parse error, unknown variable, missing key (a.bytes on a delete), division by zero, type mismatch (2 == 2.0 is an error in CEL: use double(2)), non-bool result — is a provider-style error finding and the report verdict is error. No ${…} templating in message; keep it a plain string. Use has(a.bytes) on select paths and 'text' in content[k] on indexed maps to guard optional fields.

Determinism bar (D-15), enforced in the predicate, not trusted from the lib:

• Function allowlist — only has all exists exists_one map filter size contains startsWith endsWith matches lowerAscii upperAscii trim split join indexOf lastIndexOf substring string int uint double bool bytes dyn type. timestamp, duration, now, base64, hex, json, cel.bind, optional.*, at and any unknown name → ERR_PREDICATE_PARAMS.
• RE2-safe regex — matches() takes a string literal only; lookaround (?= (?! (?<= (?<!, backreferences \1 and \k<n> are rejected.
• Resource caps — expression ≤ 4096 chars (Zod), AST depth ≤ 24, ≤ 2000 nodes, ≤ 256 list elements / map entries, ≤ 8 call arguments (cel-js limits, parse-time), and a 100 ms wall-clock guard on evaluation (ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED when exceeded).
• Closed variable set — unlistedVariablesAreDyn: false; any other identifier is an evaluation error.

A 345-case vector suite (packages/checks/src/predicates/cel-vectors.json: 197 true / 58 false / 90 error) plus a purity test (same suite twice → identical) and fast-check properties against a JS reference guard this.

{ "id": "no-large-ts", "predicate": "expr.cel", "severity": "error",
  "params": {
    "expression": "artifacts.filter(a, a.path.endsWith('.ts')).all(a, a.op == 'delete' || a.bytes < 200000)",
    "message": "TypeScript artifacts must stay under 200 KB" } }

A worked profile that combines three expressions:

{
  "apiVersion": "axiom.dev/v2", "kind": "Profile", "name": "web-cel",
  "extends": "default",
  "checks": [
    { "id": "cel.no-todo", "predicate": "expr.cel", "severity": "warn",
      "params": { "expression": "content.all(k, !('text' in content[k]) || !content[k].text.contains('TODO'))",
                  "message": "new content must not contain TODO" } },
    { "id": "cel.exec-only-scripts", "predicate": "expr.cel",
      "params": { "expression": "artifacts.all(a, a.mode != '0755' || a.path.startsWith('scripts/'))",
                  "message": "0755 is allowed only under scripts/" } },
    { "id": "cel.create-is-new", "predicate": "expr.cel",
      "params": { "expression": "artifacts.filter(a, a.op == 'create').all(a, !repo.exists[a.path])",
                  "message": "create must not target an existing file" } }
  ]
}

The last check needs facts.allowRepo (inherited from default) and an authorised root; without one it reports error, so a profile that uses repo cannot silently pass in a root-less run.

expr.cedar

Cedar policies over the same frozen facts expr.cel sees (PLAN.md S-411, decision D-25). Evaluated by @cedar-policy/cedar-wasm 4.x (Apache-2.0, ~4 MB WASM), an optional dependency of @codai/axiom-checks and @codai/axiom-mcp, loaded lazily on first use. On a host where it is not installed every expr.cedar check is an error finding (ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED, message names the package) — fail closed, never a silent pass. requires: manifest, content (repo is read when the policy text mentions exists or repo).

Param	Type	Default
policies	Cedar policy-set text, 1–65536 chars, ≤ 256 static policies, no templates	required
mode	"forbid" | "permit"	"forbid"
message	string ≤ 2000	denied by cedar policy <ids> / denied by cedar policy (default deny)
severity	"error" | "warn" | "info"	the CheckRef severity

Modes. Cedar is default-deny: a request is allowed only when some permit matches and no forbid does. mode: "forbid" appends permit(principal, action, resource); so a profile author writes forbid rules only and every deny is one finding for that artifact — the same shape as path.deny, with the full expressiveness of Cedar conditions. mode: "permit" is spec-pure: write the permits; anything not permitted is a finding with an empty facts.reason.

Authorization model — one isAuthorized request per artifact, all sharing one entity store:

Slot	Value
principal	Axiom::Plan::"<manifest.name>"
action	Axiom::Action::"create" | "overwrite" | "delete" (the artifact’s op)
resource	Axiom::Artifact::"<path>" with attributes path, op, mode, ext, dir, and when present sha256, bytes (Cedar Long), origin, text (UTF-8 blob ≤ 256 KiB), exists (repo) — guard optional ones with resource has bytes
parent entity	Axiom::Manifest::"<manifestDigest>" (resource in Axiom::Manifest::"…" holds for every artifact) with name, profile, planDigest, artifactCount, checks (ids), toolchain, counter?, preImage?
context	{ manifest: { name, profile }, repo?: { gitHead?, gitDirty? } } — repo only with an authorised root

Cedar strings support ==, like "glob*" and set .contains(); there is no regex. Numbers are 64-bit Longs (overflow is an error). Sets and if … then … else are available; &&/|| short-circuit left to right.

Fail-closed semantics. Cedar’s own rule is that a policy which errors during evaluation simply does not apply; AXIOM does not inherit that: any evaluation error (missing attribute such as resource.bytes on a delete, type mismatch, overflow, context.repo without a root) makes the whole check an error finding with Cedar’s diagnostic verbatim. Parse errors, template use and more than 256 policies are ERR_PREDICATE_PARAMS; a 2 s wall-clock budget per manifest is ERR_PROVIDER_FAILED. Policy ids are positional (policy0, policy1, …) in the author’s text; facts.reason lists the determining forbid ids sorted.

Determinism bar (D-25). Cedar is total and pure by construction — no I/O, no clock, no unbounded loops, every evaluation terminates — so unlike expr.cel no function allowlist is needed. A 156-case vector suite (packages/checks/src/predicates/cedar-vectors.json: 94 deny / 31 no-deny / 31 error across both modes and the repo activation) plus a purity test guards the predicate; expectations are hand-authored from Cedar semantics.

Why Cedar and not OPA/Rego (D-25). Rego needs opa build to produce a WASM module and a runtime with host callbacks; there is no dependency-free offline evaluator to ship. Cedar’s WASM is the reference implementation, has no host callbacks, and its policy language was designed for exactly this principal/action/resource shape.

OWASP Agent Control Standard mapping. In ACS terms AXIOM is a Guardian placed on the agent’s write channel: the Actor is the coding agent (the Axiom::Plan principal), the Actions are the artifact ops, and the Resources are the artifact paths. Of the ACS decisions allow | deny | modify | ask | defer, a check produces exactly two — pass is allow, an expr.cedar finding is deny on the whole write set (a manifest is applied atomically, so a partial allow does not exist). AXIOM never emits modify (it does not rewrite an agent’s manifest), never ask from a check (the human gate is confirmDigest on axiom_apply, upstream of the policy), and never defer (a policy that cannot be evaluated is error, which apply treats as deny). The journal is the ACS audit record.

{ "id": "cedar.write-policy", "predicate": "expr.cedar", "severity": "error",
  "params": { "policies": "
    @id(\"no-dotenv\")
    forbid(principal, action, resource) when { resource.ext == \"env\" };
    forbid(principal, action == Axiom::Action::\"delete\", resource) when { resource.dir like \"src*\" };
    forbid(principal, action, resource) when { resource has text && resource.text like \"*AKIA*\" };
    forbid(principal, action == Axiom::Action::\"create\", resource) when { resource.exists };
  " } }

The last rule reads exists, so it needs facts.allowRepo and an authorised root; without one the check is error, not pass.

Built-in profiles

Defined in packages/checks/src/profile.ts (BUILTIN_PROFILE_INPUTS). Served as axiom://profile/<name>. The Profile schema, extends, and file discovery are in profiles.md.

default

id	predicate	params
path.reservedNames	path.reservedNames	{}
content.noSecrets	content.noSecrets	{}
manifest.maxArtifacts	manifest.maxArtifacts	{ "max": 2000 }
manifest.maxTotalBytes	manifest.maxTotalBytes	{ "max": 67108864 } (64 MiB)
repo.noOverwriteOf	repo.noOverwriteOf	{ "globs": [".git/**", ".axiom/**", "**/*.lock", "pnpm-lock.yaml", ".env*"] }

limits: { maxArtifacts: 2000, maxTotalBytes: 67108864 }.

strict (extends: default)

Adds, on top of everything in default:

id	predicate	params
manifest.noDeletes	manifest.noDeletes	{}
deps.max	deps.max	{ "max": 50 }
path.deny	path.deny	{ "globs": ["**/node_modules/**"] }

permissive

id	predicate	params
path.reservedNames	path.reservedNames	{}

Custom profiles and extends

A profile is a JSON file <root>/.axiom/profiles/<name>.json matching the Profile schema (plan-format.md); its name must equal the file stem. Resolution (loadProfile):

1. Search directories are tried in order, then the built-ins.
2. extends chains are resolved parent-first; a cycle or a missing parent is ERR_INVALID_PROFILE.
3. Checks merge by id — a child entry replaces the parent’s entry with the same id, so { "id": "content.noSecrets", …, "params": { "disable": ["email"] } } in a child re-parameterises the default check rather than adding a second one.
4. limits and facts merge shallowly, child over parent.
5. The plan’s own checks[] are merged last with the same rule.

{
  "apiVersion": "axiom.dev/v2", "kind": "Profile", "name": "web",
  "extends": "strict",
  "checks": [
    { "id": "path.allow", "predicate": "path.allow", "params": { "globs": ["apps/web/**", "packages/ui/**"] } },
    { "id": "content.noSecrets", "predicate": "content.noSecrets", "params": { "allowPaths": ["**/*.test.ts"] } }
  ]
}

Adding a predicate

Follow .github/skills/add-predicate/SKILL.md: define params with Zod, implement run() so that any provider failure surfaces as an error finding (never a constant pass), register it in BUILTIN_PREDICATES, wire it into a profile if it should be on by default, add unit tests including the fail-closed path, add a changeset, and document it in this file.

---

See also

• Profiles reference — schema, built-ins side by side, extends, pii, discovery
• Signing — the manifest.requireSigned protocol in full
• Apply — how a non-pass verdict becomes ERR_CHECKS_FAILED
• Hooks — the four predicates the PreToolUse gate reuses